[TFR 32-1]

An American "Dakota" was shot down in the Kuvshinov Valley of Laos on 23 Mar 61.

Copy
[handwritten "216"]
Top Secret
Copy þ 2

TsK KPSS

11 May 1961 [handwritten "1210-sh"]

An American "Dakota" was shot down in the Kuvshinov Valley of Laos on 23 Mar 61. Major Lawrence BAILY, the US Deputy Military Attache in Vientiene, was on board the aircraft. He bailed out and was taken prisoner by a detachment of the Pathet- Lao. The remaining crew members died.

BAILY, who was interrogated by a Pathet-Lao command staff representative, stated that he carried out air reconnaissance in the area of roads þ 7 and þ 13 as well as in Kuvshinov Valley, where he was shot down, on the orders of Colonel TOLEN. BAILY also testified that from 1960 until Mar 61, the US supplied Laos with 29,000 rifles, carbines and pistols; 16 105mm guns; 100 81mm guns; 8 155mm guns; 100 howitzers; 200 large caliber machine guns; 20 APCs; 10 tanks; 100 vehicles; 15 AT-6s; 10 C-47's; 6 M-20's; 6 M-19's; and 2 helicopters.

Until recently he was in the hands of the Pathet-Lao.

Our Vietnamese friends reported that threats, diet restrictions, and withholding cigarettes were used on BAILY during the interrogation by the Pathet-Lao representative. Our Vietnamese friends, along with command staff representatives of the Pathet-Lao, intend to interrogate BAILY once again in order to clarify the information obtained during these interrogations.

CHAIRMAN OF THE KGB
[Original signed] (A.SHELEPIN)

Attest: [signature]

[TFR 32-2]

to Comrade BREZHNEV L.I.
[handwritten "18"]

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS USSR
[stamp: "Subject to return to TsK KPSS
(General Department, 4th sector)
Entry þ 10560 shsh from 31 July 1965"]
[handwritten over 'Entry þ' "1219"]

TOP SECRET

ENCODED TELEGRAM Copy þ 2

Copy	þ 1	plotting	Copy	þ 18-t	RASHIDOV	Copy	þ 35-t	
"	þ 2-t	BREZHNEV	"	þ 19-t	USTINOV	"	þ 36-t	
"	þ 3-t	VORONOV	"	þ 20-t	ANDROPOV	"	þ 37-t	
"	þ 4-t	KIRILENKO	"	þ 21-t	PONOMAREV	"	þ 38-t	
"	þ 5-t	KOSYGIN	"	þ 22-t	TsK KPSS	"	þ 39-t	
"	þ 6-t	MAZUROV	"	þ 23-t	GROMYKO	"	þ 40-t	

"	þ 7-t	MIKOYAN	"	þ 24-t	MALINOVSKIJ	"	þ 41-t
"	þ 8-t	PODGORNIJ	"	þ 25-t	SKACHKOV	"	þ 42-t
"	þ 9-t	POLYANSKIJ	"	þ 26-t	KUZNETSOV	"	þ 43-t
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"	þ 11-t	SHVERNIK	"	þ 28-t		"	þ 45-t
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"	þ 14-t	GRISHIN	"	þ 31-t		"	þ 48-t
"	þ 15-t	DEMICHEV	"	þ 32-t		"	þ 49-t
"	þ 16-t	EFREMOV	"	þ 33-t		"	þ 50-t
"	þ 17-t	MZHAVANADZE	"	þ 34-t		"	þ 51-t

from HANOI 38436 14 hrs 55 min 31 July 1965

38450 38443

[handwritten "About missile combat activity in DRV"]

[Special?] þ 617-619

EXTRAORDINARY

S P E C I A L

We are informing you on the results of the first combat activity of our missiles on 24 and 26 July. Recently we met and exchanged ideas with our Vietnamese comrades (Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguen Giap and others), and also with our senior staff specialists. It is now possible to assess the political aspect of the combat results and to draw certain conclusions.

There is no doubt that, in assigning a combat mission to the first missile regiment, our Vietnamese comrades tested the resoluteness and combat skill of our missilemen, and tested our equipment.

[handwritten "Reported to Comrade Brezhnev, L.I., 1/8."] [Printed vertically along the left margin "Making of copies is prohibited. Telegram subject to return to the 10th Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs."] [TFR 32-3] [handwritten "19"]

38436 -2- copy þ 2

The following information serves as direct and indirect evidence of this. As confirmed by our specialists, on the eve of the first battle someone, without our knowledge, checked the combat readiness of the missile installation and suggested to the Vietnamese that the equipment was old and unreliable. More than likely, they were Chinese specialists. On 24 July, the day of the first battle, the Vietnamese Regimental Commander asked our commander outright, Comrade Tsygankov, whether or not the equipment was reliable, and whether or not to initiate combat.

The Vietnamese, after having assigned the combat mission, essentially avoided taking part in the battle. Our people carried out the battle, with only a 25% complement of battery personnel. The idea that mixed crews would operate the launchers, as was agreed upon, was not realized in the first battle. This, in our opinion, was premeditated. In the event of failure, the Vietnamese "would wash their hands of the matter," and unfriendly elements would use this for their own ends.

Thus, the first battle on 24 July meant a lot for us. It could either strengthen Vietnamese faith in us and our equipment, or shake it. We believe the Soviet people and equipment stood the test. Five planes were shot down by seven missiles, which our specialists say is completely satisfactory according to our standards. One American pilot was taken prisoner. He ejected from an aircraft which was going down, leaving behind the flight engineer, whose fate is unknown. Four of the downed aircraft were found.

According to the information we received, the leadership of the DRV discussed the results of the first battle, first and foremost from the standpoint of how to react [TFR 32-4] [handwritten "20"] 38436 - 3 - copy þ 2

to it. Apparently, our Vietnamese comrades were satisfied with the combat results. Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguen Giap spoke to us about this. They hardly concealed their original doubts. Pham Van Dong said, "We, together with you, are pleased with the first success." Vo Nguen Giap also expressed satisfaction, and emphasized that Soviet specialists "displayed a high level of combat spirit." Giap informed us that Comrade Ho Chi Minh and the High Command were sending congratulations to the missilemen (on 30 July the congratulations had still not been received).

It is also significant that Vietnamese crews have already participated with our people in the second battle on 26 July.

As is now evident, the Vietnamese military system has the following drawbacks: There is no single authority, everything is decided "collectively," including how to conduct battle. This ties down the command staff and produces uncertainty, while combat is fast moving. The communication and warning systems operated poorly in battle. They informed our launcher detachment about enemy aircraft, when the aircraft were already over the launcher positions. Subunit personnel are worn out by unending meetings, conferences, and so on. As our comrades report, Vietnamese officers and enlisted "are sleeping on their feet," and on the day of the battle, 26 July, they were unable to be fed the entire day. These and other shortcomings can lead to tragic consequences in battle.

Americans, according to general opinion, conduct themselves bravely in battle only when they meet weak resistance. As is typical of the Americans, as soon as the first missile shoot-downs of aircraft became known, the command was given to all pilots to leave DRV airspace [TFR 32-5] [handwritten "21"]

38436 - 4 - copy þ 2

and they were not to be seen any more on that day (the Vietnamese provided this information).

On the third day after the first battle, the Americans undertook an attack on one of the launcher positions. If our specialists had not insisted on the redeployment of the battery on the night following the battle, there would have been serious losses, including our own people to say nothing of the equipment. The anti-aircraft cover for the missile site under bombardment was quite energetic; four aircraft were shot down. But, the technical level of the anti-aircraft gunners is weak. Americans operated at an altitude of several hundred meters.

Since these two missile launchings, the American planes try to bypass the Hanoi area. New attacks on missile sites have not been undertaken yet, but we cannot be certain that this will continue.

Our specialists have analyzed these first battles for themselves. It would be desirable if our comrades in the Ministry of Defense would also synthesize these materials and assist our specialists in extracting the appropriate lessons. Moreover, it must be kept in mind that our equipment is not being tested on a range here, but goes straight into combat; it is indispensable to test and prove it more carefully before issue from the Soviet Union. All the more so because the launchers and equipment that were used in the first missile regiment were produced in the 1956-1958 period. Of the nine missiles launched, two did not work; specialists are now determining the reasons why. There are other deficiencies which are being reported through the military attache.

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28 copies [yub]      31 July 65  I. SHCHERBAKOV
Typed 31 July 18
Dist. Plotnikov         Attest:[signature]
      Sokolovskij
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[handwritten on reverse "Presidium Archives RF, f. 3, inv. 64, file 541, pp. 18-21"] [TFR 32-6]

[handwritten "167"]
to comrade L.I. Brezhnev

MAIN INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE OF THE GENERAL STAFF
ENCODED TELEGRAM þ 13987 **TOP SECRET**

Copying Forbidden

Copy þ 1	BREZHNEV	Copy þ 9	SUSLOV	Copy þ 17	RASHIDOV
" þ 2	VORONOV	" þ 10	SHVERNIK	" þ 18	USTINOV
" þ 3	KIRILENKO	" þ 11	SHELEPIN	" þ 19	TsK KPSS
" þ 4	KOSYGIN	" þ 12	SHELEST	" þ 20	KUZNETSOV
" þ 5	MAZUROV	" þ 13	GRISHIN	" þ 21	
" þ 6	MIKOYAN	" þ 14	DEMICHEV	" þ 22	
" þ 7	PODGORNIJ	" þ 15	EFREMOV	" þ 23	
" þ 8	POLYANSKIJ	" þ 16	MZHAVANADZE	" þ 24	

from HANOI received 1650 hrs 26 Jul 65
copy þ 1

For notes and resolutions

Subject to return to TsK KPSS (General Department, 4th sector)
Entry þ 10560 shsh from 31 Jul 65³

EXTRAORDINARY

to MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION COMRADE ZAKHAROV,
MARSHAL OF THE AIR FORCE COMRADE SUDETS

I am reporting:

The 4th battalion 1st SAM regiment shot down two planes in the Sontay area (45 kilometers west of Hanoi) on 26 Jul: one U-2 at 19000 meters,and the second currently unidentified. Three rockets expended. The commander of the missile battalion is Major Il'inykh.

Concurrently, I report: according to more specific information, on 24 July, three F-4C's were shot down; one of which crashed (burned) and was inspected by us; the second crashed in the jungle (pilot was captured); the third fell in Laos, according to intelligence information.

GENERAL-MAJOR IVANOV
(VAT [Military Attache] in DRV)

þ 495
26 Jul

rs Archives
26 7 17 05
26 7 18 30
þ 14430 PR

Distributed by order of Marshal of the Soviet Union comrade Zakharov.
supplemental distribution 20 copies
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[Printed vertically along left margin "Subject to return within ten days to 8th Section of the GRU General Staff."]
[TFR 32-6a]

[handwritten on reverse "Presidium Archives RF, f.3, inv.64, file 540, sh. 167"] [TFR 32-7]

to comrade L.I. BREZHNEV
[handwritten "148"]

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS USSR

Subject to return to TsK KPSS
(General Department, 4th sector)
Entry þ 11562 shsh from 25 Aug 65

TOP SECRET

ENCODED TELEGRAM Copy þ 2

Copy þ 1	plotting	Copy þ 18	RASHIDOV	Copy þ 35	
" þ 2-t	BREZHNEV	" þ 19-t	USTINOV	" þ 36-t	
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" þ 4-t	KIRILENKO	" þ 21-t	PONOMAREV	" þ 38-t	
" þ 5-t	KOSYGIN	" þ 22-t	TsK KPSS	" þ 39-t	
" þ 6-t	MAZUROV	" þ 23-t	GROMYKO	" þ 40-t	
" þ 7-t	MIKOYAN	" þ 24-t	MALINOVSKIJ	" þ 41-t	
" þ 8-t	PODGORNIJ	" þ 25-t	KUZNETSOV	" þ 42-t	
" þ 9-t	POLYANSKIJ	" þ 26-t		" þ 43-t	
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" þ 16-t	EFREMOV	" þ 33-t		" þ 50-t	
" þ 17-t	MZHAVANADZE	" þ 34-t		" þ 51-t	

from HANOI þ 42732 0950 hrs 25 Aug 65

[handwritten "operations of missilemen in Vietnam"]

Special þ 686

EXTRAORDINARY

I am informing you, that on 24 Aug at the end of the day, the missilemen conducted a routine missile engagement with enemy aircraft south of Hanoi in the vicinity of Ninh-Binh city. Four planes were shot down. 2 pilots who ejected were captured. For the most part, the Vietnamese conducted the operation; our specialists provided instruction. There were no losses on our side. After the battle the units changed position.

Since 24 July the first regiment conducted 5 combat operations, shot down 14 planes, expended 18 rockets.

The second regiment is completing training and in the beginning of September the batteries will take up their combat positions.

[handwritten "D25 Aug"] [signature]
[TFR 32-8]

[handwritten "149"]

42732 - 2 - copy þ 2

Putting rockets into operation substantially increases DRV anti-air defense; our friends are already convinced of this. Our friends tell our specialists that the Politburo recently decided that one battalion of the First Regiment will be assigned to cover Hanoi, and three others are used as mobile units in other areas.

25 July 65 I. SHCHERBAKOV

29 copies [nd]
sent 25 August 65 1150
distr. Rekunov attest: [signature]

[handwritten on reverse "Presidium Archives RF, f.3, inv. 64, file 541, sh. 148-149"] [TFR 32-9]

3 2 3
Entry þ 124 251 5
25 Jul 66

[handwritten "Reported to Chief of Directorate, 2 Dec 66" with signature dated 3 Dec 66]

to CHIEF OF DIRECTORATE

For þ 124/163 dated 16 Aug 66

1. During 1965-1966, the Vietnamese, more or less abruptly, depending on the political climate, continued in their day-to-day affairs to isolate Soviet representatives in the DRV from any possibility of influencing the development: of events in the country, of the political policy of the local government, and also of the establishment and use of the nation's armed forces. As is well-known, at one time there were many of our advisors in the DRV in various government and military fields of activity, but, gradually, as a result of the pro-Chinese policy taken by DRV leaders, our advisors were removed from all government and military agencies. Only military and civilian specialists, who had specific technical consultation missions, were retained. Due to the military policy, our academic group was removed; and by mid-1965 a group of VAT [Military Attache] assistants, six specialists of differing arms of service, was completely banned and forced to leave the DRV.

Another variation on limiting our influence here has been the attempt of the Vietnamese government to limit our knowledge about the situation in every way possible. From this the issue of poor quality information received from the Vietnamese should be viewed as a political course taken by the leadership of the DRV-PTV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam/Workers' Party of Vietnam?] to foist upon us their assessment of the situation and force us to regard developing events in-country through the eyes of the Vietnamese.

We have repeatedly made attempts to raise the quality of information received from the Vietnamese, and to improve work on acquiring samples of American military equipment, but all attempts failed to achieve the desired results. As before, the Vietnamese hide the real situation in the DRV and South Vietnam from us. They do not share plans and intentions for carrying out operations and for conducting [handwritten "inventory 29521, case 6, pg.31-35"] [TFR 32-10] [handwritten "32"] - 2 -

the war as a whole. They conceal the delivery, already obvious to all, of troops and military equipment to South Vietnam. They conceal actual losses due to American Air Force operations in both the north and south of the country, thereby impeding a study of the effectiveness of American weapons. And, of course, they provide no information whatsoever concerning the status of VNA or NFOYuV troops [Vietnamese People's Army (VNA), National Front for Liberation of South Vietnam (NFOYuV)].

An analogous picture is also observed with regard to other joint institutions in DRV in their respective fields - the Embassy, Trade Delegation, GKEhS [State Committee on Economic Ties?], and likewise journalists and various delegations. In addition, it would be untrue to say that the Vietnamese refuse to transmit information of interest to us; on the contrary, they verbally promise us everything, they assure us that they are "studying the matter" but in fact there is no further "study." The Vietnamese use this term "to study the matter" so often, that at times it becomes comical. They even answer the question of tomorrow's weather forecast, by saying they are "studying it" and will give an answer later. This is the standard answer the Vietnamese give virtually in every case, as senior officials avoid contact with us and all work rests upon contacts with the most minor and incompetent officials, as a rule with foreign liaison officers.

Through the end of 1965, when General T.Ya. IVANOV fulfilled the duties of both VAT [Military Attache] and the senior officer of the specialist group, he had more frequent contacts with senior Ministry of Defense officials, however these contacts as a rule took place at the initiative of the Vietnamese and

were prompted by the need to discuss delivery of our equipment or to discuss the work of military specialists. The information which he took away from the meetings with these officials was very general and abstract, as is well known to the Center. Thus, from the standpoint of information, meetings with executives of the DRV MO [NVN Defense Ministry] are fruitless, given the policy of isolation which they maintain toward us.

If the Center has gotten the impression that General G.A. BELOV frequently uses meetings with senior officials [TFR 32-11] [handwritten "33"] - 3 -

to receive information, this is true only in that such meetings do take place. However, they are conducted in the interests of satisfying the needs of the Vietnamese, and by no means for the transfer of information to Comrade BELOV. The information he receives has no practical value; we carefully study all the data they provide him. The information on the situation in the DRV and in the south, which he is reporting through the 10th Directorate, he receives from us, while the information about the status of the DRV rocket and air forces he obtains through military specialists. Consequently, an opportunity for Comrade BELOV to contact senior MOD officials yields no results from the standpoint of receiving useful information.

There have been occasions when the Vietnamese command on its own initiative organized meetings of all military attaches accredited in the DRV for the special purpose of informing them about the situation. During 1966 such meetings were held twice: in March and June. No information of practical interest was presented, instead it was of a tendentious character and was suitable only for propagandistic aims. In October of this year, anticipating the arrival of a delegation headed by Comrade P.F.BATITSKIJ, I requested from the VNA Command a special report on the situation in the North and South. We gave the first copy of the report to Comrade BATITSKIJ, the second is being sent as an enclosure with this letter.

We continue to painstakingly explore the possibility of improving the exchange of information on the basis of official contacts with officers of the VNA General Staff Directorate. In order to somehow move the Vietnamese command toward more complete co-operation based on reciprocity, we supported in every way possible their desire to receive information from us; we regularly send data, which we have available, and nevertheless we still have not succeeded in creating a condition of mutual, comradely cooperation in the exchange of information. Apparently, in order to change the existing state of affairs and the Vietnamese attitude toward us, an express understanding is required at the highest level, and possibly even a special stipulation to the signed agreement [TFR 32-12] [handwritten "34"]

- 4 -

on delivery of equipment. At the present time, objective favorable conditions for this are developing - the rising military and economic difficulty in the country, and our leading role in rendering all types of aid to Vietnam.

2. The visit in October of this year by our delegation headed by Comrade P.F.BATITSKIJ once again showed that, given the insincere attitude of the Vietnamese toward us, which still continues to be present, even high level meetings cannot facilitate the receipt of needed, objective, and complete information. Policy can only be changed by policy. Without this we cannot change the attitude toward us.

Records of reports made by senior DRV Ministry of Defense officials to our military delegation are attached to this letter.

As became known from the Ambassador's information, during negotiations of the DRV delegates at the governmental level in Moscow in August of this year, the delegation leaders informed our Government, the KPSS and the Command only in the broadest possible terms, originating from their understanding of the current state of affairs. Neither their plans, nor the objective situation in the country were set out.

All of these facts and examples manifestly testify that in furnishing information to us, the Vietnamese are following a definite policy and that this policy is based upon an attitude of insincerity and distrust toward

us on the part of the DRV-PTV leadership.

3. Information received by our Embassy through the CC PTV, the DRV Government and MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], and also received by the trade delegation and the GKEhS from the corresponding DRV agencies, also does not satisfy our institutions. The Vietnamese leadership does not consider it necessary to consult with us or even to inform us in advance about projected measures.

In connection with such a situation the Ambassador is currently preparing materials for a report to the government and TsK KPSS on necessary measures aimed at improving the exchange of information and receiving needed samples of American military equipment.

[TFR 32-13] [handwritten "35"]

- 5 -

4. From their side the Vietnamese gladly receive military and military-political information from us through both VAT and government channels. They are interested not only in continuing to receive information but in broadening and deepening its scope. The way they order equipment, obviously overstating their real requirements as well as their ability to master the equipment, is analogous to their manner of seeking information. They ask, for example, for information on the armed forces of all capitalist nations or our assessment of US strategic resources and so forth; information which by its scale obviously exceeds the actual needs for information. China would certainly be interested in such information and we are assuming that they are working through the Vietnamese to have access to it.

Nevertheless, we consider it expedient to continue to transfer our information to Vietnam within the limits of reason and of what is actually required for a correct evaluation of the situation. This gives us the moral right to continue to insist on reciprocity of information sharing.

ENCLOSURES:1) Report about the situation in Vietnam on 1.10.66 - 9 pages.
2) Contents of the Report of DRV Deputy Minister of Defense dated 5.10.66 - 13 pages.
3) Meeting of the Soviet Military Delegation with DRV leaders 12.10.66 4 pages.
All enclosures are unclassified.

MILITARY, AIR FORCE and NAVY
ATTACHE ATTACHED TO THE USSR EMBASSY IN DRV
GENERAL-MAJOR OF THE AIR FORCE

[signature] A. LEBEDEV
"11" Nov 66

[signature]
[handwritten "3 Dec 66"]

[handwritten " reference Enclosures referred to information (þ 15251 for 30 Nov 66 see case þ 2640 inv. 132)
[signature]"]

[TFR 32-14]
[handwritten "Decision. 1739/115 from 22 Apr 67 (1267th)"]

[handwritten "5"]

DECLASSIFIED
3 Jul 92

Secret copy þ 7

MID USSR
USA

DEPARTMENT

TsK KPSS

secret [3]

Entry þ 429
"21" Apr 67

The US Embassy in Moscow has requested permission from the USSR MID that the Soviet Government make some kind of approach to the DRV Government for access to American POWs located in Vietnam by representatives of the International Red Cross.

The USSR MID would consider it expedient to give the Americans a verbal answer declining this request of the US Government. It is recommended that the DRV Government be informed of the American request and our answer.

A draft of the decision is attached.

I request your consideration.

[Original signed] A. GROMYKO

21 April 1967
þ 1040/GS

Attest: [signature]

Add.dup. 3 copies am.
mb-1857/gs 21 Apr 67 [TFR 32-15]

[handwritten "to entry 429"]
[handwritten "7"]

Enclosure 1

Draft

Text of the verbal answer to the US Embassy in Moscow on the question about American POWs in the DRV

With regards to the request of the American side dated 11 April that the Soviet Government make some kind of approach to the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam for admittance of representatives of the International Red Cross to American POWs located there, I have been instructed to communicate to you the following.

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam is a sovereign state, and if the US Government wants to discuss the question about the Americans, who find themselves in the custody of the DRV Government as a result of their participation in aggressive US actions against the DRV, then it should address this question directly to the DRV Government.

As to the American references for humanitarian considera- tion, these references are all the more inappropriate, since in Vietnam the USA uses on a wide scale such barbaric means as napalm, poisonous chemicals, cluster bombs, and other weapons of mass destruction, the victims of which are very often the civilian population - the old, women and children, not to mention, that in general an aggressive war, which the United States unleashed in Vietnam, is unlawful and inhumane by its nature.

to þ1040/GS

3rd [TFR 32-16]
[handwritten "1"]

Voted "for"

comrades Suslov
Shelepin
Mazurov
Voronov

Reported to comrade Yu.V. Andropov.

[signature] [TFR 32-17]

TF-3 SPECIAL FILE
[handwritten "OP 2"]
TOP SECRET

[illeg.]
USSR 4387
COMMITTEE 11 Nov 67
FOR STATE SECURITY 1st sector
of the USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
"10" Nov 67 TsK KPSS
þ 2751-A
Moscow

Recently the USSR Embassy in Japan received a request from the Secretary of the Japanese Pacifist Organization "Behjkhehjrehn" (Committee of "Peace to Vietnam"), Yosikawa Yuiti, who stated that the organization is harboring four American servicemen - Richard D. Bejli [Richard D. Bailey?] (age 19), Krejg Uil'yam Anderson [Craig William Anderson?] (age 20), Dzhon Majkl Behrill [John Michael Berrill?] (age 20) and Majkl Antoni Lindnehr [Michael Anthony Lindner?] (age 20)- who deserted from the American aircraft carrier "Intrepid," which had been operating off the coast of the DRV, in the port of Yokosuka. These servicemen expressed their disagreement with the aggressive war in Vietnam. They asked that "Behjkhehjrehn" provide assistance to them in travelling to Europe, where, according to their

information, there are organizations helping Americans who desert from the army.

"Behjkhehjrehn" considers the departure of American servicemen from Japan possible by illegally sending them to Europe on a Soviet steamer. After their send-off, "Behjkhehjrehn" plans to conduct a broad anti-military campaign by utilizing materials at the organization's disposal. This includes statements of the four American servicemen deserters.

A representative of "Behjkhehjrehn" reports that they are planning the illegal departure of the American servicemen on the Soviet steamer "Bajkal", which departs from Yokohama for Nakhodka on 11 November of this year. With these objectives in mind, "Behjkhehjrehn" will provide the Americans permits to board the ship through their own resources. They request a directive to the captain not to impede them. [TFR 32-18] [handwritten "3"] 2.

The flight of the four American servicemen can be used in the broad context of propaganda against US aggression in Vietnam. The KGB considers their delivery to the Soviet Union and forwarding to Europe, where they intend to go, expedient.

We request your consideration.

CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY

[signature] ANDROPOV

[TFR 32-19]

[handwritten "4"]

Circulated for a vote
to the members of the Politburo TsK KPSS

[illeg. signature]

15 Nov 67

[TFR 32-20]

SPECIAL FILE

[handwritten "5"]

TOP SECRET

USSR
COMMITTEE
FOR STATE SECURITY
of the COUNCIL OF MINISTERS USSR
"14" Nov 1967
þ 2771-A
Moscow

TsK KPSS

4413

Return date
14 Nov 67
Sp þ 22
TsK KPSS US Dept

The four American sailors - Richard Bejli [Richard Bailey?], Uil'yam Anderson [William Anderson], Majkl Behrill [Michael Berrill?] and Antoni Lindnehr [Anthony Lindner?] - who deserted from the aircraft carrier "Intrepid," and about whom the KGB reported on 10 Nov 67 þ 2751-a, arrived on the territory of the Soviet Union. On 15 Nov they will be sent to Moscow.

From available preliminary data, these sailors intend to go to one of the European countries where there are organized groups of Americans who oppose the war in Vietnam and the present political course of the JOHNSON Administration. The possibility is not excluded that they may request political asylum in our country from the USSR Government.

During the stay in Japan, R. BAILEY and his comrades wrote statements to the Japanese committee "Peace to Vietnam" (Behkhehjrehn), in which they harshly criticize US aggression against the Vietnamese people and the US policy concerning minor countries. These documents will be used by peace supporters in Japan with the goal of broadening the anti-military movement and strengthening the fight for the cessation of the war in Vietnam. They are planning a press conference for Japanese and foreign correspondents, accredited in Tokyo. A joint statement by the four American sailors will be read, copies of their statements and autobiographies will be distributed, and a film, produced by a representative of "Behkhehjrehn," will be shown. In the film, the sailors discuss the reasons which prompted them to desert and show full awareness that their actions

[Several illegible signatures appear along left margin, possibly indicating circulation of memo through staff.] [TFR 32-21] [handwritten "6"] 2.

will be considered a military crime by the American command for which they can be remanded to a military tribunal.

The Committee for State Security thinks it expedient to use the stay of the American sailors in the USSR and their political statements, condemning the aggressive policy of the US in Vietnam, to conduct propagandistic action in support of the just fight of the Vietnamese people.

To these ends, when the American sailors arrive in Moscow talks will be conducted with them on behalf of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace. It is intended to specify their sentiments and intentions in order to determine concrete possibilities of using them in a broad propagandistic context: conducting a press conference, appearances on television, on radio and in the press.

I request your agreement.

CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY

[signature] ANDROPOV

[The following is handwritten "Communicated to Comrade Yu.V. Andropov 16 [Nov?] 67"] [signature]
[TFR 32-22]
[handwritten "There is [two words illeg.]"] Top Secret
copy No. 2
Copy [Crossed out: "Draft"]

[handwritten "16 Nov 67"]

TsK KPSS
14 Nov 1967
[handwritten "2771-A"]

The four American sailors - Richard Bejli [Richard Bailey?], Uil'yam Anderson [William Anderson], Majkl Behrill [Michael Berrill?] and Antoni Lindnehr [Anthony Lindner?] - who deserted from the aircraft carrier "Intrepid," and about whom the KGB reported on 10 Nov 67 þ 2751-a, arrived on the territory of the Soviet Union. On 15 Nov they will be sent to Moscow.

From available preliminary data, these sailors intend to go to one of the European countries where there are organized groups of Americans who oppose the war in Vietnam and the present political course of the JOHNSON Administration. The possibility is not excluded that they may request political asylum in our country from the USSR Government.

During the stay in Japan, R. BAILEY and his comrades wrote statements to the Japanese committee "Peace to Vietnam" (Behkhehjrehn), in which they harshly criticize US aggression against the Vietnamese people and the US policy concerning minor countries. These documents will be used by peace supporters in Japan with the goal of broadening the anti-military movement and strengthening the fight for the cessation of the war in Vietnam. They are planning a press conference for Japanese and foreign correspondents, accredited in Tokyo. A joint statement by the four American sailors will be read, copies of their statements and autobiographies will be distributed, and a film, produced by a representative of "Behkhehjrehn," will be shown. In the film, the sailors discuss the reasons which prompted them to desert and show full awareness that their actions [TFR 32-23]

2.

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To these ends, when the American sailors arrive in Moscow talks will be conducted with them on behalf of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace. It is intended to specify their sentiments and intentions in order to determine concrete possibilities of using them in a broad propagandistic context: conducting a press conference, appearances on television, on radio and in the press.

[Three typed lines illeg]

I request your agreement.

CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY

ANDROPOV

copy verified: [TFR 32-24]

[handwritten "61"]

[handwritten "Concur:"] TOP SECRET
[signature]

35284

TsK KPSS 2nd SECTOR

Representatives of the Committee for State Security [KGB], under the guise of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, conducted discussions with American sailors K. ANDERSON, D. BARILL [BERRILL?], R. BEJLI [BAILEY?] and M. LINDNER, upon their arrival in Moscow. The discussions concerned the reasons which prompted them to desert, their intentions and plans for the future, and also the possibility of their public appearances in the Soviet Union.

As these talks showed, the American servicemen were firmly convinced of the injustice of the aggressive US war against Vietnam. They appear disposed to be pacifists, but they do not have any firm political views. By upbringing, all four belong to the so-called American middle class.

After having developed and elaborated their statements before representatives of the Japanese public, the Americans delivered a statement addressed to the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace in which they condemned American aggression against the Vietnamese people. The American sailors also made a request to the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace and to the Soviet people to help them further their struggle for peace outside the Soviet Union.

The American sailors expressed their readiness to publicly speak out in the Soviet Union with statements intended to unmask the inhuman US war against Vietnam.

The work with the American sailors continues with the aim of advantageously influencing them to us and of inclining them toward more decisive and harsher political condemnation of US aggression in Vietnam.

Deputy Chief
of the Foreign [signature]
Department (R. Ul'yanovskij)
TsK KPSS

[handwritten "Reference
24 Nov 67 [signature]
The measures, which were outlined in the note, are
2429s being put into effect under the control of
officials in 18.11.67 the international
department of the TsK in cooperation 25-s/14
with departments of the MID and KGB. Information
on the given question is attached. In archive(?).
22 Nov 1967. Section Director, International
Department, TsK. (signature)
TsKhSD, r 8387, fond 4, inv. 20, file 972, page
61-67] [TFR 32-25]

[handwritten "62"]
2.

In regards to the foregoing, the Committee for State Security thinks it expedient, with participation and in the name of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace to implement the following measures in the near future:

- Publish in the Soviet press a joint statement of the four American sailors addressed to the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace.

- Publish an article-feature story in the newspaper "Pravda" about a correspondent's conversation with the American sailors.

- Organize an appearance of the American sailors on Moscow radio and television with a relay transmission on international television.

- Organize a meeting of the American sailors with Moscow State University students.

- Publish in the Soviet press personal statements of the American sailors.

- In accordance with the request of these Americans, the Committee for State Security, USSR MID and the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace will take measures toward guaranteeing further travel of the American sailors to western European countries. In view of the Americans' lack of proper documents,

it is expedient to give them certificates as stateless persons, validated by the Soviet Red Cross and Red Crescent Society.

Coordinated with the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace (Comrade M.I. KOTOV).

We request your consent.

[signature] ANDROPOV

[signature] GROMYKO

"17" Nov 1967

"17" Nov 1967

þ 2802-A

[TFR 32-26]

[handwritten "63"]

to comrade D.F. USTINOV

For the vote
By the Secretariat TsK KPSS

Concur:
M.Suslov

Top Secret

[handwritten "FOR - D. Ustinov"]

TsK KPSS

Representatives of the Committee for State Security [KGB], under the guise of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, conducted discussions with American sailors K. ANDERSON, D. BARILL [BERRILL?], R. BEJLI [BAILEY?] and M. LINDNER, upon their arrival in Moscow. The discussions concerned the reasons which prompted them to desert, their intentions and plans for the future, and also the possibility of their public appearances in the Soviet Union.

As these talks showed, the American servicemen were firmly convinced of the injustice of the aggressive US war against Vietnam. They appear disposed to be pacifists, but they do not have any firm political views. By upbringing, all four belong to the so-called American middle class.

After having developed and elaborated their statements before representatives of the Japanese public, the Americans delivered a statement addressed to the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace in which they condemned American aggression against the Vietnamese people. The American sailors also made a request to the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace and to the Soviet people to help them further their struggle for peace outside the Soviet Union.

The American sailors expressed their readiness to publicly speak out in the Soviet Union with statements intended to unmask the inhuman US war against Vietnam.

The work with the American sailors continues with the aim of influencing them advantageously to us and of inclining them toward more decisive and harsher political condemnation of US aggression in Vietnam.

2429s 18.11.1967 [TFR 32-27a] [handwritten "64"] to comrade A.P. Kirilenko For the vote By the Secretariat TsK KPSS

Concur: Top Secret
M.Suslov
[handwritten "Kirilenko"]

TsK KPSS

Representatives of the Committee for State Security [KGB], under the guise of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, conducted discussions with American sailors K. ANDERSON, D. BARILL [BARRILL?], R. BEJLI [BAILEY?] and M. LINDNER, upon their arrival in Moscow. The discussions concerned the reasons which prompted them to desert, their intentions and plans for the future, and also the possibility of their public appearances in the Soviet Union.

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The American sailors expressed their readiness to publicly speak out in the Soviet Union with statements intended to unmask the inhuman US war against Vietnam.

The work with the American sailors continues with the aim of advantageously influencing them to us and of inclining them toward more decisive and harsher political condemnation of US aggression in Vietnam.

2429s 18.11.1967 [TFR 32-27b] [handwritten "65"] to comrade I.V. Kapitonov For the vote By the Secretariat TsK KPSS

Concur: Top Secret
M.Suslov

[handwritten "Kirilenko"]

TsK KPSS

Representatives of the Committee for State Security [KGB], under the guise of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, conducted discussions with American sailors K. ANDERSON, D. BARILL [BERRILL?], R. BEJLI [BAILEY?] and M. LINDNER, upon their arrival in Moscow. The discussions concerned the reasons which prompted them to desert, their intentions and plans for the future, and also the possibility of their public appearances in the Soviet Union.

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The American sailors expressed their readiness to publicly speak out in the Soviet Union with statements

intended to unmask the inhuman US war against Vietnam.

The work with the American sailors continues with the aim of advantageously influencing them to us and of inclining them toward more decisive and harsher political condemnation of US aggression in Vietnam.

2429s 18.11.1967 [TFR 32-28] [handwritten "66"] INFORMATION

On 21 Nov 67 in the International Department sector there was an exchange of ideas concerning the implementation of measures, outlined in a known decision regarding the stay in Soviet Union of four American sailors from the aircraft carrier "Intrepid."

The stated preliminary opinion (that it is desirable to limit the period of the Americans' stay in the USSR to 5-7 days) was based upon the operative views of our organs. Because of this, a significant extension of such a period is undesirable (view of Comrade S.A. Kondrashev).

Assuming this period of time, it is possible to carry out the following measures:

- 22 Nov at 1700 to hold a meeting in the MGU club between the American sailors and students of the University (only Soviets). Introducing the Americans at this meeting will be the Committee of USSR Youth Organizations (Comrade Yarovoj) and the Soviet Committee for Support of Vietnam.

- Organize an interview of the American sailors with correspondents from the newspaper "Moscow News" and magazines "New Time" and "Soviet Union."

- Prepare an interview for the influential French bourgeois magazine "Paris Match" in compliance with the request received from this magazine through the APN.

- USSR MID (Deputy Chief of the US Department Comrade Zinchuk) and the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace (Kotov) are preparing and will send an encoded telegram to the Soviet Embassies in Finland, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia with instructions to communicate their views on the basic question of forwarding the four American sailors to Western European countries and on active exploitation of them by progressive forces there. After receiving responsive information and opinions from the Soviet Embassies, the Soviet Committee for Support of Vietnam and the Soviet Committee for Defense of Peace can send an open telegram with a request for cooperation to appropriate public organizations in one of these countries. [TFR 32-29] 2. [handwritten "67"]

It should be kept in mind that the security of the four American sailors is already of interest to certain progressive (anti-military) circles in the USA, who may possibly take upon themselves some of the material support of these sailors and at the same time will keep track of their appearances in Western European countries.

- Taking into account the necessity of initial material support for the four Americans during their stay in one of the Western European countries, the Soviet Committee for Support of Vietnam and the Soviet Committee for Defense of Peace will prepare proposals on the amount (approximately 1000 American dollars each) as well as on the appropriate form of offering them such assistance.

- In reference to the requests of the DRV Embassy and of correspondents of the Vietnamese Information Agency (VIA) for a visit by the Americans to the DRV Embassy and for sending tape recordings of their appearances in the USSR to the Rassel Tribunal which is underway in Copenhagen, inform our Vietnamese comrades that this presents difficulties for the American sailors. Namely, the sailors have a definite position which they worked out while still in Japan with the help of American pacifists; it is essential for us to respect this fact.

- Invite VMA correspondents and the "Liberation" agency (NFOYuV) to a meeting with Soviet MGU students, where they will be given the opportunity to talk with the Americans, with the consent of the latter, taking into account that these sailors are now on trial in absentia by a military tribunal in the USA.

This being the case, in their statements they must be able to counter prosecution charges that they not only deserted but voluntarly entered into direct collaboration with the Vietnamese. It may well be that direct contacts with the Vietnamese do not enter into the plans of the sailors nor of the pacifist circles in the USA which are organizing legal defense for the trials in absentia.

G. Shumejko
[signature]

2ti [handwritten "22 Nov 1967"]
[TFR 32-30]
[handwritten "There is agreement(?) TsK KPSS"] Copy
[handwritten "251?"]
TOP SECRET
Copy þ 3

TsK KPSS

Representatives of the Committee for State Security [KGB], under the guise of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, conducted discussions with American sailors K. ANDERSON, D. BARILL [BERRILL?], R. BEJLI [BAILEY?] and M. LINDNER, upon their arrival in Moscow. The discussions concerned the reasons which prompted them to desert, their intentions and plans for the future, and also the possibility of their public appearances in the Soviet Union.

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The American sailors expressed their readiness to publicly speak out in the Soviet Union with statements intended to unmask the inhuman US war against Vietnam.

The work with the American sailors continues with the aim of advantageously influencing them to us and of inclining them toward more decisive and harsher political condemnation of US aggression in Vietnam. [TFR 32-31] [handwritten "257"] 2.

The flight of the four American servicemen can be used in the broad context of propaganda against US aggression in Vietnam. The KGB considers their delivery to the Soviet Union and forwarding to Europe, where they intend to go, expedient.

We request your consideration.

CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY

ANDROPOV

[TFR 32-32]
copy
[handwritten "182"]

TOP SECRET
Copy No. 3 [handwritten "3082-TS"]

TsK KPSS

According to available information, American authorities are exerting pressure on government circles in Finland, Sweden, and other countries, in opposition to granting permission for transportation and residence, in the indicated countries, for four American sailors--K. ANDERSON, D. BARILL [BERRILL?], R. BEJLI [BAILEY?] and M. LINDNER, who deserted from the aircraft carrier "Intrepid" and are presently in the Soviet Union.

However, a consultation using neutral channels with representatives of the Swedish peace movement revealed that the arrival of these sailors in Sweden without Swedish entrance visas enables the Swedish "Committee for Peace in Vietnam" and other local peace organizations to ensure the further stay of the four American sailors in Sweden.

The risk that the Swedish Government may return the sailors to the Soviet Union is compensated for in that the Swedish Government would appear in an adverse light before public opinion and would have to retreat from traditional Swedish policy on granting asylum to political immigrants and refugees.

These sailors, immediately after arrival in the Soviet Union, declared that they intend to seek residency and participation in the fight for peace in Vietnam in one of the neutral European countries. In the context of propaganda, the American sailors' actions, [TFR 32-33] 2.

as is well known, were widely used and have had a positive result.

The delay of the American sailors on Soviet territory is not expedient and is tied in with definite difficulties. It must also be taken into consideration that on the grounds of their insufficient political maturity, the American sailors prefer departure to Europe. One of them even has a fixation about possibly turning himself in to the US Embassy in Moscow.

Taking into account the recommendation of the Swedish peace supporters, it would be advisable to make arrangements to have the four sailors sent from the Soviet Union to Sweden via Scandinavian Airlines on the 29th of December.

We request your approval.

GROMYKO TSVIGUN

25 December 1967

No. 3082-TS

N. 155/2560

[TFR 32-34]

ARTICLE þ 35/136gs from 3 Dec 1967TOP SECRET
[handwritten "Special file"]
ÚÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ¿
³ SPECIAL FILE³
ÀÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÙ

RESOLUTION [handwritten "67"]

Secretariat of the TsK of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

---

About rendering material aid to the four American sailors

To accept the proposal of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace and the Soviet Vietnam Support Committee on rendering material assistance to the American sailors Majkl Linder [Michael Lindner?], Krejg Anderson [Craig Anderson?], Richard Bejli [Richard Bailey?] and Dzhon Berill [John Berrill?] for living and travel expenses in Western Europe covering the next six months in the amount of one thousand American dollars each.

The Ministry of Finance of the USSR is to apportion four thousand American dollars for these ends, as estimated by the Soviet Vietnam Support Committee, and will be reimbursed in Soviet rubles from the Soviet Peace Fund.

[signature]
[handwritten "KGB confirms [signature]
the proposal"]

Results of the voting:
[handwritten ""for" [signature]
"for" [signature]
[signature]
[signature]
comrade Brezhnev L I "for"
2 Dec 67 [signature]"]

Copies to comrades [handwritten "Gromyko, Tikhonov,
428 Pimenov, Garbuzov, Georgadze, Ponomorev."]
30 Nov 67

Circulated: 3 Dec 67 [signature]

[TFR 32-35]
SPECIAL FILE

[handwritten "69"]
SECRET
Copy þ 1

TsK KPSS
35714 4665
22 Nov 67
[illeg.]2ND SECTOR
subject to return
GENERAL SECTION
TsK KPSS

To the Central Committee CPSU

The American sailors who served on the aircraft carrier "Intrepid", Majkl Linder [Michael Lindner?], Krejg Anderson [Craig Anderson?], Richard Bejli [Richard Bailey?] and Dzhon Berill [John Berrill?], and who are presently in Moscow, intend to leave for western countries (Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, France) in the near future. They intend to contact peace organizations in these countries and to continue their active work for ceasing American aggression in Vietnam.

The American supporters of peace do not have the means for passage and stay in the West.

We would consider it necessary to render them material assistance of one thousand dollars each for travel and living expenses in western countries for six months.

Bear in mind that partial payment in foreign currency could be given to the Americans upon departure from Moscow and the remaining sum transferred through acceptable channels in those countries which accept the Americans as aid to social organizations that speak out for peace.

We request that you consider apportioning four thousand dollars to the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace and the Vietnam Support Committee for rendering assistance to the four American supporters of peace.

The indicated sum in foreign currency can be reimbursed in Soviet rubles at the expense of the Peace Fund.

Chairman Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace	Chairman Soviet Vietnam Support Committee
[signature] (N. Tikhonov)	[signature] (P. Pimenov)

[TFR 32-36]

[handwritten "70"]

INFORMATION

In concord with the Minister of Finance of the USSR (comrade P.A. Maletin).

International Section TsK KPSS
Reviewer [signature] (O. Kharkhardin)

"27" November 1967 [TFR 32-37]

TM-3

SPECIAL FILE
TOP SECRET

SUBJECT TO RETURN

USSR 4387
COMMITTEE
FOR STATE SECURITY
of the COUNCIL OF MINISTERS USSR
"22" Dec 1967
þ 3070-U
Moscow

22 Dec 67
2nd sector
to TsK KPSS Gen.sec.

TsK KPSS [handwritten "65"]

The four American sailors located in Moscow, who deserted from the aircraft carrier "Intrepid," have requested meeting in Moscow with representatives of the FNOYuV. It is advisable to set up such a meeting, especially since the DRV Charg, d'affaires informed the MID of the USSR about FNOYuV representative Dang Quang Minh's desire to meet with the four American sailors.

Also bear in mind that our Vietnamese comrades, through their own resources, will distribute, in a leaflet, an appeal by the four sailors to American servicemen in South Vietnam.

To maximize the political effect achieved as a result of the American sailors' propaganda appearances, it is recommended that an interview of these sailors with Richard Reston be organized. Richard Reston is the Moscow correspondent of the major American newspaper "Los Angeles Times." The nature of the questions prepared by Reston for the interview gives a basis to assume that the appearance of this interview in the American press will enhance the future growth of the campaign for peace in Vietnam.

The MID of the USSR (comrade N.P. Firyubin) supports the proposal that the sailors meet with a FNOYuV representative and Reston.

Request concurrence.

DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY
[signature] TSVIGUN

[handwritten
"4596
23 Dec 67 27 Dec 1967
[signature]"]
[TFR 32-38]

[handwritten "Urgent"]

ARTICLE þ 55/213 from 20 Jul 1968 TOP SECRET

SPECIAL FILE

RESOLUTION [handwritten "110"]
Secretariat of the TsK of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
---
The issue of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity of Asian and African Countries

1. To allow the Soviet Committee for Solidarity of Asian and African Countries to give two former American servicemen 300 dollars each in connection with their departure to Sweden.

2. The Board of the State Bank of the USSR is to exchange, for the Soviet Committee for Solidarity of Asian and African Countries, Soviet rubles into six hundred American dollars from the hard currency account of the State Bank of the USSR.

[signature]
[signature]

Results of the voting:
[handwritten "for [signature]
[signature]
[signature]
[signature]
[signature]

Copies to comrades [handwritten "Ponomarev, Gromyko,
233 Tursun-Zada, Poskonov."]
18 Jul 68
Circulated: 20 Jul 68
[signature]

[TFR 32-39]

SPECIAL FILE

[handwritten "111"]

þ Article 55/213gs
55 213gs 20 Jul 68

The issue of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity of Asian and African Countries

1. To allow the Soviet Committee for Solidarity of Asian and African Countries to give two former American servicemen three hundred dollars each in connection with their departure to Sweden.

2. The Board of the State Bank of the USSR is to exchange, for the Soviet Committee for Solidarity of Asian and African Countries, Soviet rubles into six hundred American dollars from the hard currency account of the State Bank of the USSR.

SECRETARY OF THE TsK

Sent to: comrades Ponomarev, Gromyko, Tursun-Zada, Poskonov.
[TFR 32-40]
Subject to return within 24 hours to TsK KPSS (General

Workers of the World, Unite!

section, 1st sector)
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. CENTRAL COMMITTEE.

TOP SECRET
þ P73/47 SPECIAL FILE

to comrades Brezhnev and Andropov.

Excerpts from protocol þ 73 of the TsK KPSS Politburo meeting
of 11 March 1968

Issue of the Committee for State Security.

1. Agree with the proposals of the Committee for State Security, given in note þ 438-A from 24 Feb 1968.

2. Instruct the Soviet Committee for Solidarity of Asian and African Countries (comrade Zasokhov), acting on behalf of the Vietnam Support Committee, to accept American military deserters arriving from Japan, to provide for their stay in the USSR and the appropriate political work with them, and also their departure to countries, which will agree to give them political asylum.

In case the chairman of the Japanese Committee "Peace-to-Vietnam" ODA should arrive in the USSR, establish contact with him in order to coordinate actions on expoiting the desertions of American servicemen for political purposes.

SECRETARY TsK

7-ak
pe

[Typed along the left margin]
For your information
A comrade receiving secret documents must not pass them to or acquaint anyone with them without special permission from the TsK.
Copying or making notes of these documents is categorically forbidden.
A note and the date an individual familiarized himself with the document should be made on each document personally by the comrade to whom the document is addressed and with his own signature. [TFR 32-41]

[handwritten "21"]

USSR
COMMITTEE
FOR STATE SECURITY
under the COUNCIL OF MINISTERS of the USSR
24 February 1968 TsK KPSS
þ 438-A

According to available information, the Japanese "Peace to Vietnam" committee (Bekhejrehn) continues its work to provide active assistance to deserting American military personnel in their illegal departure from Japan to third countries in order to seek political asylum.

In early Nov 67, "Bekhejrehn" organized the transport to the Soviet Union of four American sailors, who deserted from the aircraft carrier "Intrepid." In Feb 68, this committee illegally transported an American of Korean nationality to Hong Kong in order to eventually send him to the KPDR.

The indicated incidents were widely and effectively used by "Bekhejrehn" in a propaganda and disclosure campaign against the American aggression in Vietnam and also to increase anti-war sentiment among US military personnel so that they refuse to participate in the war in Vietnam.

At the present time the Japanese committee "Peace to Vietnam" is getting ready for the illegal transport from Japan of three American servicemen who deserted from their units: Corporal I.L. Knet' and Privates Eh.S. Arnett and F.Eh. Kollikot. They intend to send them to Europe via the Soviet Union.

The leaders of "Bekhejrehn" count on accomplishing the transport of this group of American servicemen from Japan to the territory of the Soviet Union on their own.

At one of the meetings with our representative, the secretary of the "Peace to Vietnam" committee Yosikawa requested financial support for the committee, and specifically in order to realize the current undertaking, requested an amount of 200 thousand yen [TFR 32-42]

[handwritten "22"]
2.

(500 foreign currency rubles). At the same time Yosikawa stated, that at the end of Feb, Oda, chairman of the "Peace to Vietnam" committee is coming to the Soviet Union and several European countries, through Cambodia, in order to establish closer contacts with European pacifist organizations who speak out in defense of Vietnam.

Considering the above, the Committee for State Security considers it expedient to:

1. Using a covert contact between the KGB and the leadership of the Japanese "Peace to Vietnam" committee, assist in furthering its activities, including financial assistance when necessary to broaden propaganda work, and provide for the illegal transport of American deserters from Japan to third countries.

2. The KGB should inform the secretary of the "Peace to Vietnam" committee that the Soviet Union cannot at this time allow the illegal transport of American deserters in Soviet vessels. However, let them know that if the committee finds an alternate means of transport of the Americans to the territory of the USSR, (for example, from Hokkaido Island on Japanese fishing vessels), then the Soviet side will not stand in the way.

3. Task the Soviet Committee for Solidarity of Asian and African Countries on behalf of the Vietnam Support Committee to accept American servicemen-deserters arriving from Japan, to carry out work with them advantageous to the Soviet Union and to arrange for their departure to countries which will offer them political asylum (coordinated with Zasokhov).

The Vietnam Support Committee should establish close contacts with the Japanese "Peace to Vietnam" committee and use the upcoming visit of Committee Chairman Oda to the USSR for this purpose.

0757

[TFR 32-43]

3.

For its part, the KGB is ready, through available unofficial resources, to provide assistance in maintaining communication with the leadership of the Japanese "Peace to Vietnam" committee, and also to assist in influencing the committee in a manner advantageous to the Soviet Union.

Draft resolution is enclosed.

Please consider.

CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY

[signature] ANDROPOV

0757

[TFR 32-44]

URGENT

ARTICLE þ 50/287gs from 26 Apr 1968TOP SECRET

SPECIAL FILE

RESOLUTION [handwritten "246"]

Secretariat of the TsK of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

---

The issue of the Soviet Vietnam Support Committee

1. Accept the offer of the Soviet Vietnam Support Committee to organize a trip to Leningrad and Tbilisi for the group of former American servicemen (six people), who deserted from the US Army as a sign of protest against the war in Vietnam and are arriving in the USSR from Japan.

The Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party and the Leningrad Obkom KPSS are to coordinate with the Soviet Vietnam Support Committee in acquainting these Americans with Soviet reality.

Allow the Council of Ministers of the USSR Committee on Broadcasting and Television to organize appearances by the former American servicemen on radio and television disclosing American aggression in Vietnam.

(see continuation)

Results of the voting:

[signature]
[signature]
[signature]
[signature]
[signature]
[signature]
[signature][signature][signature]

Copies to comrades [handwritten "Gromyko, Tursun-Zada,
122 Garbuzov, Poskonov, Mesyatsev, Ponomarev; TsK of Georgia, Leningrad Obkom KPSS.
26 Apr 68

Circulated: 26 Apr 68

[signature]

[TFR 32-45]

[handwritten "247"]

2.

(continuation)

2. The Ministry of Finance of the USSR is to disburse to the Soviet Committee for Solidarity of Asian and African Countries 1,800 American dollars from the hard currency account of the

State Bank of the USSR.

Charge the expenditures, associated with the arrival of the indicated group of Americans in the Soviet Union and their transit to one of the countries of Europe, to the Soviet Committee for Solidarity of Asian and African Countries.

[signature]
[signature]
[signature]

2vzh **1501**
[TFR 32-46]

SPECIAL FILE

[handwritten "248"]

þ Article 50/287gs
50 287gs 26 Apr 68

The issue of the Soviet Vietnam Support Committee

1. Accept the offer of the Soviet Vietnam Support Committee to organize a trip to Leningrad and Tbilisi for the group of former American servicemen (six people), who deserted from the US Army as a sign of protest against the war in Vietnam and are arriving in the USSR from Japan.

The Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party and the Leningrad Obkom KPSS are to coordinate with the Soviet Vietnam Support Committee in acquainting these Americans with Soviet reality.

Allow the Council of Ministers of the USSR Committee on Broadcasting and Television to organize appearances by the former American servicemen on radio and television disclosing American aggression in Vietnam.

2. The Ministry of Finance of the USSR is to disburse to the Soviet Committee for Solidarity of Asian and African Countries 1,800 American dollars from the hard currency account of the State Bank of the USSR.

Charge the expenditures, associated with the arrival of the indicated group of Americans in the Soviet Union and their transit to one of the countries of Europe, to the Soviet Committee for Solidarity of Asian and African Countries.

SECRETARY OF THE TsK

Sent to: comrades Gromyko, Tursun-Zada, Garbuzov, Poskonov, Mesyanev, Ponomarev; TsK KP Georgia, Leningrad Obkom KPSS.

[TFR 32-47]

SPECIAL FILE
[handwritten "249"]
TOP SECRET

SUBJECT TO RETURN
1501
THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE of the KPSS 26 Apr 1968
2d sector
to TsK KPSS Gen.sec.

By the decision of the TsK KPSS P73/47 dated 11 Mar 68, the Soviet Committee for Solidarity of Asian and African Countries (comrade Dzasokhov) in the name of the Vietnam Support Committee was charged to welcome into the Soviet Union the former American servicemen, who deserted the US Army as a sign of protest against the war in Vietnam and arrived in our country from Japan.

At the present time, six former American servicemen have arrived on the territory of the USSR. They will be forwarded to one of the neutral countries by the Soviet Committee for Solidarity of Asian and African Countries with the assistance of the KGB.

The Soviet Committee for Solidarity made a proposal to the TsK KPSS to organize a trip for the indicated Americans to Leningrad and Tbilisi in order to acquaint them with Soviet reality, and also to have them appear on radio and television disclosing American aggression in Vietnam.

In order to carry out the necessary work with the indicated group, the Soviet Committee for Solidarity of Asian and African Countries requests apportioning funds in the amount of 5,840 rubles and 1,800 dollars (three hundred dollars each).

We consider it necessary to support the proposal of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity of Asian and African Countries.

Foreign currency expenditures could be taken from the hard currency account of the State Bank of the USSR. Expenditures in

Soviet rubles will come from the Soviet Solidarity of Asian and African Countries Committee.

Coordinated with the Minister of Finance (comrade Chumikov). Draft resolution to the TsK KPSS is enclosed.

Deputy Chief Foreign Department
TsK KPSS [signature] (R. Ul'yanovskij)
"26" April 1968
þ 25-S-665 [TFR 32-48]
[handwritten "250"]

USSR
Soviet Committee for Solidarity of Asian and African Countries
Address: 10 Kropotkina St., Moscow

þ _ "___"_____ 196

[Entire page is handwritten]
TsK KPSS

By the decision of the TsK KPSS dated 11 Mar 68, P-73/47 the Soviet Vietnam Support Committee was charged with carrying out the necessary political work with the American servicemen-deserters, who arrived in the USSR through the Japanese public organization "Behkhehjrehn" (Peace to Vietnam). At the present time, according to a KGB report, there are six former American servicemen on the territory of the Soviet Union.

According to the information of Oda Makota, chairman of Behkhehjrehn, the indicated group of former US Army servicemen possesses documents of political importance, especially in the plane of disclosing the methods of conducting an aggressive war in Vietnam, the practice of using biological and chemical weapons. Members of the group are direct participants of military operations in South Vietnam.

They would consider the adoption of suitable political work with this group necessary. With this goal

1501

[TFR 32-49]
[Entire page is handwritten.]

251

it is proposed to organize public statements for members of the group in the press, on radio and television.

During their stay in the Soviet Union, it is intended to acquaint them with Soviet reality and to organize trips to Leningrad and Tbilisi. The program also foresees a meeting with members of the indicated group, with the objective of explaining the position of the Soviet Union and the people of our country on the Vietnam problem. The whole program will be carried out with the active assistance of the Committee for State Security [KGB]. By the end of their stay in the USSR (two weeks), the group with the assistance of the KGB will be transported to one of the neutral

European countries. For conducting all necessary work, we ask you to examine the following questions:

1. Task the Moscow Soviet to provide to the Soviet Committee for Solidarity of Asian and African Countries with living space for 8-10 persons (in the Moscow suburbs) with suitable personal services for 1 month.

2. Apportion 5,840 rubles and also 1,800 dollars (approximately three hundred dollars each) from the reserve funds of the Soviet Ministers of the USSR for the expenditures connected with the arrival and

1501

[TFR 32-50]
[Entire page is handwritten.]

252

departure of the group.

3. Task the TsK of the Workers Communist Party and the Leningrad Obkom KPSS to render the necessary assistance in organizing the work with this group.

The Executive Secretary of the Soviet Committeefor
Solidarity of Asian and African Countries

25 Apr 68 [signature] (N. Dzasokhov).

1501

[TFR 32-51]
lg-3 SPECIAL FILE
[handwritten "9"]
TOP SECRET

Return date
USSR 4601
COMMITTEE 25 Nov 67
FOR STATE SECURITY 1st sector
under the COUNCIL OF MINISTERS USSR TsK KPSS-US Dept
"25" Nov 1967 TsK KPSS
þ 2874-A
Moscow

The information being received from abroad shows the great

impact the brave act of the four American sailors is having on public opinion in many countries.

In order to further develop the campaign against American aggression in Vietnam, we consider it would be advisable to take the following steps:

1. Prepare a leaflet on behalf of the four American sailors with their photographs and signatures containing an appeal to American servicemen in Japan, who are permanently stationed there and who go there for vacation, to protest against the aggressive war in Vietnam. Distribute this leaflet in Japan among American servicemen through the Japanese organization "Behjkhehjrehn" ("Peace to Vietnam" committee).

2. Prepare a leaflet containing an appeal from the four sailors to be given to American servicemen located in South Vietnam, appealing to them to refuse to participate in the Pentagon's aggressive war and demonstrate in favor of the right of the Vietnamese people to decide their own fate.

Suggest that our Vietnamese friends distribute the leaflet in South Vietnam using their assets.

3. Have the four sailors address the youth of the world and appeal to them to carry out a tenacious battle for peace, for stopping the US aggression in Vietnam, and for uniting the anti-war efforts of the youth. [TFR 32-52]

[handwritten "10"]

2.

4. Have the four sailors address the youth of America with an appeal to continue and to strengthen their campaign to curtail the war in Vietnam and withdraw US armed forces. Disseminate this message by radio, press, leaflets, the sale of newsreels and so on, and time this to coincide with anti-war week in the US. Anti-war week begins on 4 December of this year.

Request concurrence.

CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY

[signature] ANDROPOV

[TFR 32-53]
copy þ 1405/gs

[handwritten "7"]

OP

CONCERNING MEASURES TO BE TAKEN AGAINST THE AMERICAN AGGRESSION IN VIETNAM.

Motion made by comrade Andropov

VOTED:

comrades: Brezhnev - [handwritten "for"]
Voronov - for
Kirilenko - for
Kosygin - for
Mazurov - for
Pel'she - for
Podgornij - for
Polyanskij - [handwritten "vacation"]
Suslov - for
Shelepin - [handwritten "vacation"]
Shelest -

[handwritten "not drawn up"]
[signature]
27 November 67

original

copy t.

61-16
27 November 67

[handwritten "checked by Bakurov and [illeg.] 27 November 67"]

[TFR 32-54]

[handwritten "urgent"]

[handwritten "61-16"]

[handwritten "(1) 8"]

To be sent to the members of the Politburo
of the TsK KPSS for voting

[handwritten "17"]
[handwritten "2 27 November 67"] [signature]
[TFR 32-55]

TsK KPSS

1945
15 Jul 1968
2nd sector
sub. to return TsK KPSS

USSR

Soviet Committee for Solidarity of Asian and African Countries
Address: 10 Kropotkinskaya St., Moscow [handwritten "113"]

þ 095S "15" JulY 1968

Secret
Copy þ 1

TsK KPSS

The Soviet Committee on Solidarity of Asian and African Countries was tasked to receive the former US Army servicemen and to establish in the name of the Soviet Vietnam Support Committee proper political work with the former servicemen, who deserted from the US Army in South Vietnam.

On 26 June the group of former US Army servicemen consisting of Rajmond Georg Sansiv'er [Raymond George Sansiviero?], Iotsaj Ou Yang and Rehndi Barton Kouts [Randy Barton Coats?] arrived in the Soviet Union from Japan. Upon arriving in the Soviet Union, the indicated American citizens addressed a request to render them assistance for passage to Sweden and transferred their written statements, in which they condemn US aggression in Vietnam and state their decision to desert from the army, as a sign of protest.

During the night of the 1st to the morning of the 2nd of July R.B. Kouts fled to the US Embassy in Moscow. In a meeting, which took place with representatives of the Soviet Vietnam Support Committee, which was held in a room of the OVIR in the presence of US Embassy workers, Kouts reported about the change in his decision and desire to leave for the USA.

By agreement with the MID of the USSR (comrade G.M. Kornienko) and the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR (comrade S.A. Kondrashev) it was considered expedient not to hinder his departure.

Necessary political work is being carried out with the remaining two former American servicemen. In meetings with representatives of the newspapers "Pravda," "Izvestia," "Komsomolskaya Pravda" and the magazine "Ogonek," R.G. Sansiviero and Iotsay Ou Yang disclosed information, which seems of interest for the foreign public [TFR 32-56]

[handwritten "114"]
2.

concerning the exposure of US military political crimes in Vietnam. In case the American side exploits the Kouts case, we plan to publish in our press the written statement which he gave us, and also the above mentioned testimony of the two other members of the group.

Presently, an agreement has been reached through the Soviet

Embassy in Stockholm with the Swedish Committee on Vietnam (Svanster) concerning the transport of R.G. Sansiviero and Iotsaya Ou Yang to Stockholm from Leningrad on 20 Jul.

In connection with the above, we request the apportioning of six hundred American dollars to the former American servicemen for the first period of their stay in Sweden.

Executive Secretary
Soviet Committee for Solidarity of
Asian and African Countries

[signature] (A. Dzasokhov)

[TFR 32-57]

SPECIAL FILE
[handwritten "112"]
TOP SECRET

SUBJECT TO RETURN
2669
TsK KPSS 18 Jul 1968
2nd sector
to TsK KPSS Gen.sec.

By the decision of the TsK KPSS P73/47 dated 11 Mar 68, the Soviet Committee for Solidarity of Asian and African Countries (comrade Dzasokhov) in the name of the Vietnam Support Committee was charged with welcoming the former American servicemen, who deserted the US Army as a sign of protest against the war in Vietnam, to the Soviet Union.

At the end of July of this year three former US Army servicemen arrived in the Soviet Union from Japan. One of them (R.B. Kouts) fled to the US Embassy in the USSR and declared that he was changing his decision and expressed a desire to leave for the USA. The necessary work is continuing with the two other Americans. The Soviet Committee for Solidarity of Asian and African Countries intends to transport them to Sweden on 22 Jul 68 according to the agreement with the Swedish Committee on Vietnam and requests apportioning six hundred American dollars to the two former American servicemen (three hundred dollars each) for the first period of their stay in Sweden.

We consider it expedient to support the request of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity of Asian and African Countries.

Foreign currency expenditures should be charged to the hard currency account of the State Bank of the USSR. This has been coordinated with the directorship of the State Bank of the USSR (comrade Vorob'ev).

Draft resolution to the TsK KPSS is attached.

Deputy Chief Foreign Department
TsK KPSS [signature] (R. Ul'yanovskij)

"18" July 1968
þ 25-s-1164 [TFR 32-58]
[handwritten "þ P127/76 from 9 Jul 1969"] [handwritten "22"]
MID USSR
USA DEPARTMENT
[signature]

SECRET DECLASSIFIED
Entry þ 814 "3" Jul 1992
" 5 " June 1969

SECRET COPY þ 6

TsK KPSS

The US Ambassador in Moscow, J.Beam, appealed to the MID of the USSR on behalf of his government with a request to render assistance "in easing the fate of American servicemen, who are in North Vietnam" (the concession of their right to correspondence, allowing them to be seen by the Red Cross, and so on).

On similar previous appeals by the Americans, we informed our Vietnamese comrades. Presumably, this would be advisable in this case too, noting however that we made no promises on this account to the Americans. The issue of an an/swer to the Americans can be decided according to the reaction of our Vietnamese comrades.

Draft resolution is attached.

Please examine.

[Original signed][signature]

"5" July 1969

þ 1078/gs

[6-ga?]/GK
3 Jun 69
þ 308 ossha
[signature] [handwritten "Verified:"][signature]
[TFR 32-59]
[handwritten "23"]
MID USSR
USA DEPARTMENT
[handwritten "l 814-oshchs"

SECRET DECLASSIFIED
Entry þ 813 "3" Jul 1992
" 4 " June 1969
SECRET COPY þ 6
Draft

TsK KPSS RESOLUTION

On informing the Government of the DRV concerning the American appeal concerning POWs.

Approve the draft instructions to the Soviet Ambassador in Hanoi on the given issue (attached). [handwritten illeg. + initials]

SECRETARY TsK

1078/gs
[illeg]
ib-1851/gs
4 June 1969 [TFR 32-60]
[handwritten "284"]

3d DIRECTORATE 2d SECTION GRU
Entry þ 140/320 15th
"13" JulY 1975 sheet

[illeg. handwriting]

REPORT

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS in Hanoi
for the 2nd quarter of 1970

1. Intelligence situation

For the preceding 2d quarter, the intelligence situation in the DRV and, particularly in Hanoi, did not substantially change. Despite the elapse of more than two years since American aviation stopped bombing DRV targets, the country remains on wartime footing with all its attributes, initiated during the course of the air war against the DRV.

Citing the military situation, the leadership of the PTV-DRV persistently continued to mobilize the population with regard to increased vigilance, observance of laws "punishing counter-

revolutionary activities," "prohibiting contacts with foreigners," and so on.

Control of foreigners remains in the hands of MGB organs. Representatives of socialist countries, who are in most cases in the DRV to render immediate aid, are in no way free from such controls. The Vietnamese systematically place obstacles in the way of officials of the Soviet Embassy in the DRV, even to their attempts at business contacts with officials due to official necessities. In the course of official meetings with Soviet representatives, our Vietnamese comrades conduct themselves insincerely and secretively, using every means to reduce the amount of information given to us, and occasionally consciously distorting it.

Requests from the Soviet Embassy to the MID of the DRV for trips to the northern and western provinces of the DRV, as a rule, are not satisfied. In this respect, the Vietnamese placed the Soviet Embassy in a clearly discrimina-

[handwritten "Inventory 30948, case 5, sheets 284,298"]
[TFR 32-61]
[handwritten "298"]
[NOTE: Page(s) 285-297 evidently missing]

[illeg.] messages. He is making efforts to establish new ties. He participated in informational work. He controlled the VAT [military attache] funds.

SPECIAL GROUP - during the quarter consisted of two people. Of the group personnel, due to the completion of the tour of temporary duty, Nulin departed for the Motherland [Soviet Union], group leader Spasov was on leave. Regarding the group, the Vietnamese side held its former line - practically complete restriction of the ability to work normally. Despite our repeatedly raising the question to the Vietnamese of the necessity to create conditions for normal group operations, the situation is not changing. Previous high level appeals to the Vietnamese side also did not produce results. We intend to thoroughly discuss this issue with the Soviet Ambassador and will report our thoughts separately.

The group obtained, through unofficial channels, an American hand grenade which will be sent to the Center.

THE ADVISORS are successfully coping with their obligations despite undermanning. The Advisory Group Chief Major N.I. Bubnov skillfully manages the group. Secret paperwork is systematically checked. Your instructions for þ 158 were carried out.

As a whole the political morale of the advisory collective is good. Members of the collective recognize their responsibility to our assigned mission. There have been no breaches of military discipline or violations of behavior standards of Soviet citizens abroad.

[signature] KATRO
Distributed to: single copy
3 July 70 Issue þ 335

[TFR 32-62]

MID USSR [handwritten "18"]
MID USSR GENERAL SECR.
USA DEPARTMENT
SECRET
SECRET Entry þ 3265 DECLASSIFIED
Entry þ 478 28 March 72 "3" Jul 1992
"29 " March 1972

SECRET COPY þ 1
[handwritten "comrade Fedoseev"] "28" March 1972
[signature- "29 Mar"]to comrade N.P. FIRYUBIN þ 161 YuVA

The US Embassy in Moscow appealed to the MID of the USSR and the Directorate of Foreign Relations of the Ministry of Communications of the USSR with a request to explain why the Ministry of Communications is not accepting packages, starting in February of this year, sent from the USA to the DRV for American pilots who were taken prisoner in North Vietnam.

As is known, questions regarding the handling of these packages are decided on a bilateral basis between the representatives of the USA and DRV. The Ministry of Communications of the USSR serves a purely intermediary role, transferring these packages to Vietnam after getting agreement from the Communications Directorate of the DRV. According to a report of the Directorate for Foreign Relations, Ministry of Communications, USSR (Comrade Yu. I. Savinskij), on 6 March of this year the Communications Directorate of the DRV instructed the Ministry of Communications of the USSR that no changes in practice of handling packages for American pilots who are prisoners in North Vietnam had occurred. The Vietnamese side expressed their readiness, as before, to accept one package, weighing no more than 3 kg. per captured pilot, once every 2 months, stipulating that any package which did not meet the conditions will be returned. On 10 March of this year, the Ministry of Communications of the USSR transmitted this information to the US Postal Service. During 1972, the Ministry of Communications of the USSR received for relay and sent to Hanoi 521 packages, 407 of which were returned by the Vietnamese side without any explanation.

With consideration to the above, it can be reported to the US Embassy in Moscow that in accordance with established practice, matters regarding the handling of packages for American pilots who are imprisoned in North Vietnam will be decided on a bilateral basis between the American and Vietnamese parties. The Ministry of Communications of the USSR is of course prepared to continue

[TFR 32-63]
[handwritten "19"]
2.

the technical functions of delivering packages to the DRV. As regards the return of a portion of these packages and other complications arising from this, the American side must clear up these matters directly with the Vietnamese side.

Request your review.

[handwritten "[illeg] (make the report orally)]
[signature - "29 Mar 72"]

[signature]
G. KORNIENKO

[signature]
S. NEMCHINA

2-ksh/MI
yuvam/551
28 Mar 72

[TFR 32-64]

MID USSR
Dept of the USA
Secret
Entry þ 1789
27 Sept 1972

DECLASSIFIED
3 July 1992

TsK KPSS

On 27 September three American fliers released by DRV authorities are arriving in Moscow in transit from Peking to Stockholm. The wives of two of them and five activists from American anti-war organizations are arriving with them. Departure of this group from Moscow for Stockholm is scheduled for 29 September.

The US Embassy in Moscow approached the MID of the USSR with a request to allow Embassy representatives the opportunity to meet with the three American fliers, to issue them American passports, and offer them help in returning to the USA as soon as possible, and also to arrange a meeting of these people with the temporary US charg, d'affaires and the Embassy doctor.

In connection with the above, we would suggest it expedient:

1. Upon arrival of the American fliers in Irkutsk, tell them (via KGB resources) of the intentions of the US Embassy in Moscow to establish contact with them and let them decide the matter themselves. Simultaneously, inform the US Embassy of the time of arrival in Moscow of the fliers, saying beforehand that the possibility of meeting with Embassy representatives depends fully on the fliers.

2. Instruct the Soviet Vietnam Support Committee to invite the representatives of the American anti-war organizations who are escorting the fliers for a meeting, should they so desire. No actions are to be undertaken with the participation of these American fliers during their stay in Moscow.

3. Instruct the MGA to accommodate the arriving group of Americans in the Aeroflot Hotel for transiting passengers.

The draft resolution is attached.

Request your review.

K. KATUSHEV [original signed] V. KUZNETSOV

"26" September 1972
þ 1906/gs

Attest: [initials]

[TFR 32-65]
[handwritten "Entry þ 1789-USA Dept"]
[handwritten "93"]

DECLASSIFIED
3 July 1992

Secret Copy þ 6

Draft

DECREE TsK KPSS

regarding the transit through Moscow by
American pilots, released by DRV authorities

For concurrance with the points laid out in the Department TsK KPSS note and MID USSR þ 1906/GS dated 26 September 1972.

TsK SECRETARY

to 1906/gs
6 distro'd
fm-1982gs
26 Sept 72 [TFR 32-66]
[stamp - DECLASSIFIED
"3.07" 19 "92"]
Secret, copy No. "175"
"16" January 1986

File No. "6"/Department of the USA

[handwritten "for file"]
[illeg. signature]
[handwritten "16.1.86"]

About American-Vietnamese Negotiations Concerning US
Military Personnel Missing in Action in Vietnam

On 6-7 January 1986, a US governmental delegation, headed by Deputy Secretary of Defense R. Armitedzh [Armitage], was in Hanoi. The delegation also included Assistant Secretary P. Vulfovits [Wolfowitz], representative of military political problems of SNB R. Childres, and the executive director of the League of Families of American Servicemen Missing in Action in Southeast Asia, E. Griffits [Griffiths].

The American delegation was received by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the SRV Hguen Ko Tkhatem and held discussions with the Vietnamese delegation headed by Vietnamese Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Khoang Bit' Shonom on questions concerning the search of information on Americans missing in action during the war in Vietnam.

The Vietnamese regarded the visit of the American "high level delegation" first and foremost as a plan "to draw the US into a dialog with Vietnam" and "to influence the policies of China, Thailand, and other ASIAN countries in their relations with SRV."

In the course of the negotiations, the Vietnamese emphasized that the MIA problem is "solely of a humanitarian nature," and therefore the USA should not tie in their decision with any political conditions, including the normalization of Vietnamese-American relations.

The Vietnamese have promised to pass the US information on another 50 American servicemen who died in Vietnam; they gave approval for the next meeting of Vietnamese and American experts for the end of February 1986;

þ 36-osma [TFR 32-67]
[handwritten "76"]
2.

they agreed to continue in 1986 joint excavations in the crash sites of shot down American planes; they gave the Americans a draft of the "Memorandum on Mutual Assistance," concerning the completion during 1986-1987 of the program on the search for information about MIAs, while taking into consideration the American points stated earlier.

The American delegation did not give a final answer on the draft memorandum, stating that it will report this issue to their administration. The delegation only expressed the necessity for continuing the search within this two-year period as long as the problem has not been "completely resolved."

According to Vietnamese information, until the arrival of the American delegation in the SRV, the USA, through Indonesia, expressed a desire to establish a permanent US delegation in Hanoi to search for information about MIAs. However during the negotiations, both sides acknowledged that setting up such a delegation is premature. The Vietnamese reaffirmed their position to the Americans that a US delegation in Hanoi could only be established under the conditions of the establishment of an SRV delegation in Washington.

After the American departure from Hanoi, a White House representative announced once again that the normalization of American-Vietnamese relations is linked with settling the MIA problem and with the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampucha.

This declaration, according to the assessment of the Vietnamese, "runs contrary to the agreements attained during negotiations in Hanoi." In regards to this, the Vietnamese on 9 January 1986, through their representatives in New York and Bangkok, asked the American side for an explanation of this announcement. With this, the Americans were given to understand, that until receiving from the US an official answer to this question, the Vietnamese side reserves the right to review the agreement for a meeting of experts at the end of February 1986.